SPECIAL ISSUE
Cross Linguistic Approaches to Language Awareness

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A Cross-linguistic Approach to Language Awareness

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Although mother tongue (MT) and foreign language (FL) teaching and learning have much in common, there is little evidence that teachers exploit the relationship in any systematic way. This paper revives Eric Hawkins' idea of a language studies trivium where Language Awareness activities should fill the 'space between' the learner's two languages. A distinction is drawn between awareness and consciousness of language, and cross-linguistic relationships are suggested to be a major, yet unexploited source of input salience strengthening, evidence being adduced from natural bilinguals' metalinguistic activities. Suggestions for the classroom are outlined.

A Space Between

In 1974 CILT published a collection of papers edited by George Perren under the title The Space Between. These explored some possibilities for a symbiotic cooperation between teachers of the mother tongue (MT) and foreign language (FL) teachers, and sketched out a tentative language awareness (LA) curriculum. When one compares the two UK government publications English for Ages 5 to 16 (Cox, 1989) and Modern Foreign Languages for Ages 11–16 (Harris, 1991) it becomes clear that 'the space between' is still not being bridged as advantageously as it might be. As Mitchell et al. (1994: 14) report:

Pupils in the English and FL classrooms seem to be receiving largely unrelated messages in the KAL [knowledge about language] area: in the FL classroom, attention is focused on 'Language as System' at the sentence level or below, while in the [MT] English classroom, attention is focused on the level of the whole text.

The difference is accidental and arbitrary, probably reflecting the MT teachers' primarily literary (Eng. Lit.) education and the FL teachers' familiarity with applied Structuralist linguistics. It is certainly an obstacle to cooperation between the two groups of teachers.

Ways of Knowing

We can start by asking what sorts of linguistic knowledge people can have. First, they can develop a Chomsky-competence and a related set of behaviours and cognitive intuitions about their MT or about an FL they are learning. None of these can be 'wrong', since each is sufficient to itself: the forms you produce and accept must comply with your intuitions and reflect your competence, otherwise you would not produce them, but others instead. That is why we have to say that native speakers (of their MT or of their Interlanguage) are infallible. Of course they can make slips, and may be semi-literate, but that is a different matter. There is a second sort of linguistic knowledge people can have: they can
develop metacognitions of their personal versions of their MT and FL separately. These metacognitions (the stuff of LA) can be wrong, inappropriate, inauthentic or bogus. Trévise (this volume) shows how MT and FL metacognitions can be influenced for the worse by a rote-learned metalanguage uncritically switched on. The result is pseudo-metacognition, and this may be formulated in a pseudo-metalanguage.

So far, we have dealt only with ways of knowing either language (MT or FL) in isolation, itself something of an idealisation, since one never knows a second language in isolation from one’s first. But there is another sort of knowledge to take into account: knowledge of the relationships holding between one’s two languages. This knowledge can be held at the procedural level of performance (being manifest in MT interference on FL use), or at the cognitive level of intuition, in which case we talk of Cross-linguistic Intuition (XLI). Or knowledge can be held at the explicit (declarative) level of metacognition, which we shall call Cross-linguistic Awareness (XLA).

All three of these can be right or wrong: we see positive and negative MT transfer in FL performance. Then, as Kellerman (1978) showed, FL learners’ cognitive ‘psychotypology’, their intuitions about what forms they feel to be transferable (or unique to the MT and therefore nontransferable) can be counterfactual. It seems plausible that someone who transfers from MT to FL indiscriminately has no XLI. The learner with a modicum of XLI will transfer selectively, to use some transferable L1 items to his advantage, and to not use (to suppress) some MT forms which look deceptively transferable but in fact would lead to negative transfer (error) if used in the FL. Likewise, knowers’ and learners’ metacognitions about what they see as the relationships between the two languages (XLA) can be in error: misanalysis is still metacognition, as Trévise shows. Linguistic intuitions are still intuitions whether right or wrong, and linguistic metacognitions are still metacognitions irrespective of their veracity. This is especially true of XLA, which is verbalised and explicit: verbalisations that do not represent the ‘true’ facts of the language are bogus, signalling an unawareness of the phenomena in question (as Trévise shows here). They might, for example, be mythical, second-hand accounts of language of the sort that Preston (1996: 41) calls ‘folk descriptions’, and which may often be scientifically inaccurate. In a nutshell, learners’ assumptions about transferability of certain forms from MT to FL, and learners’ metacognitions about language must contain a grain of truth before we can recognise them as indices of XLI or XLA.

**Awareness and Consciousness**

I would argue that metacognition of language comes not in one, but in two versions. In addition to LA, we have consciousness of language, usually found in the collocation consciousness-raising (CR). Many people treat ‘consciousness’ and ‘awareness’ as synonyms, and even hybridise them into ‘conscious awareness’, which is to obscure a valuable distinction. Schmidt (1990: 132) for example, posits a state of ‘consciousness as awareness’. They should be viewed as complementary and the key to an integrated (space-filling) language curriculum.

I define language awareness (LA) as the possession of metacognitions about language in general, some bit of language, or a particular language over which
one already has skilled control and a coherent set of intuitions. Poldauf (1995: 5) states 'No doubt a learner is only aware [my emphasis: C] of those forms and those types of [sic] language which he actually wields'. Levelt et al. (1978: 5) refer to it as 'implicit knowledge that has become explicit'. Read (1978: 73) sees it as involving 'focusing attention on something that one knows'. As a seminal work anticipating the British School of LA put it, 'The task of the [MT] teacher is not to impart a body of knowledge, but to work on, develop, refine and clarify the knowledge and intuitions that his pupils already possess' (Doughty et al., 1971: 11). Likewise Tinkl (1985: 38) sees LA work as essentially working with 'already-possessed linguistic knowledge'. H.V. George (1972: 187) must have had LA in mind (although he labelled it 'grammar') when he wrote: 'A grammar is the result of insight into data already acquired'.

In other words LA is a metacognitive attribute of knowers and competent (though not necessarily native) speakers, to the extent that they have developed metacognition of the skills and associated cognitions that they had hitherto exercised 'unawares'. For example, linguists (Radford, 1988: 556) substantiating Trace (T) Theory have shown that native speakers of standard English find (a) and (b) below grammatically acceptable but (c) unacceptable as instances of spoken English:

(a) Who do you wanna meet T?
(b) Who do you want T to sing?
(c) Who do you wanna sing?

The reason for this, it is argued, is that _Who_ in every case has been fronted and has left behind a trace T. In the case of (a), being the object of _meet_, T did not separate _want_ from _to_, which allows them to contract to _wanna_, as in _I wanna meet Joey_. In (b) the contraction has not been made, since it has been blocked by the T, which separates _want_ from _to_, as in _I want Joey to sing_. The same is not true of (c), where the T does separate _want_ from _to_, despite which contraction has been attempted, resulting in ungrammaticality, as would also be the case with _I wan-Joey-na sing it_. Speakers 'know' this as a matter of intuition. They say (a) and (b), and accept it when others do and do not say, and reject (c). LA work involves making this tacit knowledge explicit, without resorting to the metalanguage of T Theory however. When this LA happens even the _blase_ native speaker experiences a _eureka_ sensation.

Of course, the _wanna_ example is an idealisation of LA raising, something that hardly, if ever, happens in the real world beyond university seminars on Government & Binding theory. Real-world LA involves encouraging and helping knowers to refine and enlarge their capacity for _language use_, to exploit more fully the combinatorial and expressive potential of that cognitive system or 'calculus' (their language) that they have mastered intuitively by the age of five or six. It is a practical rejection of academic linguistic complacency that drives LA work, a refusal to accept that a person's linguistic _capacity_ (his having internalised a grammar of the language he speaks) is by itself sufficient to ensure that his linguistic _needs_ will be catered for. This is not the case, and having the grammar is not enough: it is a tool that you have to learn to use competently, and the apprenticeship to this competence is LA. It is like a personal computer. Ninety
per cent of owners know how to use only 20% of their p.c.’s capacity: they need to do some computer awareness work.

An example of candidates for LA work is some BBC/ITV newsreaders who seem unable, though their lack of LA, to read aloud texts in a way that conveys the meanings intended by their authors. They read relative clauses in ways that ignore the restrictive/nonrestrictive dimension. They locate contrasitive stress arbitrarily and disrupt the whole topic: comment articulation of messages. It is clear that these newsreaders command a full repertoire of the formal options of English grammar to a degree that would be the envy of many a professor of English overseas. But they seem to have insufficient LA to associate systematically these formal options with semantic distinctions: their language use is defective in intentionality. They are not perspicacious as language users, and lack LA, or what Candelier & Gnitzmann (1990: 114) so neatly express as ‘das sich im Klaren-Sein eines Sprechers’.

CR is by contrast for language learners, who are not yet in command of these formal repertoires and consistent intuitions. Snow (1976: 154) suggests we learn by becoming conscious of what we do not know. The language being learnt is usually a FL, but it could also, in principle, be the MT. CR is predicated on an inadequacy in linguistic competence and skilled performance (Anderson’s (1983) ‘procedural knowledge’) that has to be bridged by a heightened declarative knowledge. Rutherford & Sharwood Smith (1985: 274) define CR as ‘the deliberate attempt to draw the learner’s attention specifically to the formal properties of the target language’. But surely this does not mean drawing attention to all the properties of the FL indiscriminately. It more probably means drawing attention to those properties the learner must learn, but might have been experiencing problems in learning. Drawing attention to those formal properties of a language he knows, in order to expand his communicative capacity is, according to my definition, LA raising. I define CR, therefore, as activity that develops the ability to locate and identify the discrepancy between one’s present state of knowledge and a goal state of knowledge. CR gives the learner an equally important but different insight into what he does not know and therefore needs to learn, if he is to put such deficiencies right.

The Awareness: Consciousness distinction has some affinity to that drawn by Thomas (1983) between two sorts of shortcoming found among FL learners. Pragmalinguistic failure originates in the learner not having access to the linguistic means to express his intended meaning in the FL, and the alternative forms he does use, while getting the message across, introduce some unwanted and inappropriate pragmatic effects, such as issuing a request that sounds to the recipient like a command. Sociopragmatic failure by contrast results when the learner is in command of a range of FL forms to convey his message, but lacks a sense of stylistic appropriacy. Making the connection to CR/LA, pragmalinguistic deficit implies insufficient knowledge of the formal devices (“usage”) of a language, and calls for CR. By contrast, the person who knows the forms (“usage”) but not how to deploy them (“use”) is in need of LA work, like our newsreaders.

The New Trivium

Now, it would be tempting to argue that LA work is exclusively for knowers
in MT classrooms, and CR exclusively for learners in FL classrooms. What a neat arrangement that would be! To do so, however, would be to dichotomise the two operations and perpetuate the vacuous ‘space between’ MT and FL teaching. This is what happened under classical Contrastive Analysis, when proactive transfer was earmarked for FL learning and retroactive (termed ‘backlash’) transfer for MT performance, when in fact both directionallities of transfer are operative in both MT and FL learning. Although CR and LA work are distinctive in the ways I have outlined, both are effective in both MT and FL classrooms. One can do CR of one’s deficiencies in MT and FL classes, and one can take stock of what one knows in both these settings also. Recognising and exploiting this potential and mutual relevance will help to break down the barriers between MT and FL classrooms, to provide a unified ‘whole-language’ reflective experience.

What interests me even more though, is the effect of their coincidence, that is in what ways the learner’s newly-raised LA can give him insight into the FL, and, conversely, how newly-raised consciousness of properties of the FL might impinge on his MT. Lynn Wales’ paper in this collection describes a school-based project in Australia that set out to do exactly this. This is what Hawkins (1981) originally had in mind when he saw LA as a subject bridging the ‘space between’ MT and FL studies. He proposed the now famous new twentieth century trivium, similar to the mediaeval curriculum comprising grammar + logic + rhetoric:

MT Study: ——————→LA Work ←——————FL Study

Under this scheme, MT study would be illuminated by FL study, since ‘Only by getting outside the MT and operating [...] in another language, can the MT be seen objectively’ (Hawkins, 1984: 36). Conversely, one’s understanding of the workings of the FL can be illuminated by MT study, by transferring one’s MT metacognitions to the task of FL learning. Seeing MT and FL ‘objectively’, first in terms of their immanent systemicity, and then each in terms of the other, is to develop one’s linguistic metacognitions of each.

In the early stages of FL learning the learner will have to depend metacognitively on a combination of high LA of NL and high CR of the FL, since he has little LA of the FL at this beginning stage. Also, he will not immediately appreciate the need for some CR of his NL knowledge, so need will have to be demonstrated. As command of the FL develops, the relative proportions will gradually be reversed, so that at an advanced stage the learner has high LA of both MT, if there is an MT LA programme (of the sort Wales describes) in place, as well as a high LA of the FL. At the early stages, MT and FL learning will be very differently organised, but they will converge as time goes on, as knowledge of the two languages equalises. This convergence reminds us of suggestions concerning the relationship between ‘formal’ and ‘communicative’ FL content in a balanced FL teaching programme (Widdowson, 1978): in the early stages, formal input has to predominate, since the pupils have, as yet, nothing to communicate with. In the course of time, the tables are turned, communicative learning being given priority over formal learning. Likewise the relationship between the FL learner’s reliance on two types of transfer: from the MT (interlingual) in the early stages, as opposed to within the FL (intralingual) at the advanced stages of FL learning. Again, in the early stages, almost all transfer will
have to be interlingual, the other sort (intralingual) gradually increasing as more and more of the FL is assimilated.

**Noticing and Contrastive Salience**

LA and CR each involve ‘noticing’ (Schmidt, 1990: 144) something about a language (NL or FL) that one had not noticed earlier, often (as teachers know too well) despite having had the opportunity of exposure, despite the provision of direct positive evidence, despite having had practice opportunities, and, in the case of NSs, despite using the form routinely (literally!). Because the learner had not noticed it, it was not available for intake, and because the user hadn’t, it had not become an object for circumspect and discriminating use, that is, use that is ‘critical’ as Fairclough (1992) would call it. As to what makes an aspect of the FL noticeable, Schmidt suggests frequency, functionality, and, most important, I think, perceptual salience. It is here where the contrastive dimension comes to the fore, since one of the determinants of the perceptual salience of an FL item must be its relationship to its MT equivalent, especially when the learner already has LA of that MT item. As Odlin shows in this volume, FL elements (phonological and syntactic) that contrast with corresponding MT items are high in salience, with the result that speakers of the same MT as learners are able to identify these learners’ MT by spotting their typical MT transfer errors. Here the cross-linguistic dimension shows itself again, since salience is especially pronounced if the learner has high LA of the corresponding MT item. Putting it at its simplest, it pays dividends not to call a halt when one has got some LA of MT and done some CR of FL, but to put these two together, so as to see one’s CR in the context of one’s LA and one’s LA in the light of one’s CR. Just as one can not know an MT and an FL separately, the one never impinging on the other, so one can also not know about them separately: as both Trévise and Py show here, the language transfer issue of classical Contrastive Analysis becomes a new issue of metalinguistic transfer — and its relationship to cross-linguistic awareness.

There are two potential sources of salience for any TL form. First the TL form itself may be inherently salient, and so universally noticeable. Secondly, the salience may be contrast-dependent or cross-linguistic. What is more, these two sorts of salience have opposite effects on learning. An inherently salient TL form has an enhanced likelihood of being acquired, whereas a TL form that is salient by virtue of its contrast with the corresponding MT form is less likely to be acquired. The learner spots the snag and suppresses MT transfer. It is a form of direct negative evidence that tells him not to say it in the way his MT does.

**Bilinguals’ Awareness of Language**

Contrastive Analysis (James, 1980) was developed, by Weinreich and Haugen, in order to explain what happens when two languages come into contact in the bilingual brain. Within their historical constraints, these linguists stressed the behavioural, performance consequences of the contact. They did not consider the cognitive, and much less the metacognitive consequences. What we now know is that bilinguals find ways to fill that ‘space between’ to their advantage. We now refer to this advantage as the ‘additive’ cognitive asset of bilingualism. Ben-Zeev (1978) suggests three sources of this asset, which originate in the
bilingual's 'attempts to resolve the interference between his languages'. These are:

(1) He indulges in language analysis, refining his awareness of the different ways in which each language 'processes a given paradigm', e.g. formulates its relative clauses, passives, apologies etc. As Lambert & Tucker (1972) put it, bilinguals practise a form of 'incipient contrastive linguistics'. The result is beneficial, and it may be the case, as Clark (1978: 23) claims, that 'learning two languages at once [...] might heighten one's awareness of specific linguistic devices in both. Blum-Kulka & Scheffer (1993) have shown this awareness at work in the perceptive metalinguistic comment that goes on at the dinner table gatherings of bilingual families in Israel.

(2) Bilinguals strive very hard to develop a mechanism to keep their two languages apart. They do this by maximising their perception of the structural differences between them: they are on the look-out for contrastivity. We discussed above the way that noticeability affects intake, and Kuperberg & Olshtain (this volume) demonstrate the truth of this.

(3) Bilinguals are more sensitive to feedback than monolinguals, which makes them open to correction. Feedback, being communication about language, is metalinguistic and involves the exercise of metacognition. Correction implies a prior act of comparison: the speaker compares what he says with a 'paragon' and makes necessary adjustments. Klein (1986: 138) sees the 'matching problem' as fundamental to FL learning. For Schmidt (1992), matching is what determines 'what learners consciously notice'. It also underlies Krashen's Input Hypothesis (1985) whereby the learner notices a discrepancy between his current level of competence *i* and a new structure that is *i+1* and therefore a candidate for learning.

The Input Hypothesis — which is a projection from the Built-in Syllabus Hypothesis of Corder (Corder, 1967: 169) — states that FL input should be 'fine-tuned'. This requirement suggests that the learner can calculate fine mismatches such as that separating *i* and *i+1*, but not gross mismatches involving say *i* and *i+8*. If the learner can make these fine *intralingual* discriminations, he can surely also make equally fine cross-linguistic ones. Contrast, defined in classical Contrastive Analysis as difference against a background of sameness, is by nature fine-grained. It is the 'background of sameness' that provides, after all, the place to transfer the MT form to: Andersen's 'Transfer to Somewhere' principle (see Kellerman, 1995).

An integrated language education policy would systematically do in the classroom what bilinguals do socially and spontaneously, and what Kuperberg & Olshtain (this volume) do experimentally. Seliger (1983: 181) noticed that 'language learners are often curious about grammatical relationships they have observed between the target language and their own language'. I suggest they don't do this spontaneously but have to be shown how. Cumming (1990: 491) identified 'comparing cross-linguistic equivalents' as a strategy used by successful L2 writers, but then writing is a formal activity conducive to linguistic reflection. I suggest that natural acquirers, while they can reflect spontaneously on the more general features of Interlanguage, such as its pidgin features, are not
so adept at spotting MT:FL connections. Recall how Zoila, the Guatemalan immigrant office cleaner in New York studied by Shapira (1978) reflects on her English. We are told clearly that ‘She did not and still has not had [sic] any formal instruction in English’ (Shapira, 1978: 253). She comments authoritatively on learners’ universal temptation to dispense with morphology and function words — ‘the esses and little words’ — but seems not to be cognisant of those deficiencies in her English that originate in her Spanish MT. Zoila has some Interlingual Awareness, that is a capacity to contemplate her own (Interlanguage of) English, but does not have much Cross-linguistic awareness, or verbalised insight into why her Interlanguage is the way it is. Her Contrastive Awareness, or that part of cross-linguistic awareness that is exclusively focused on MT:FL contrasts, is also low.

Zoila’s self-diagnosis for her ‘non-learning’ of English is illuminating: ‘I no study never’. Zoila somehow knows what school can do for her English. This is a renewed appeal to the school as the proper place to ‘fine tune’ learners’ FL, and it is not hard to justify. Singler (1988) observes that Sierra Leonine English becomes less contaminated by Mende in proportion to the speaker’s level of education: schooling puts in place some sort of interference filter, it seems. One can nowadays, though it would have been anathema a generation ago, make out a strong case for doing Contrastive Analysis for CR and LA purposes in class.

**In-class Linguistic Confrontation**

And ‘in class’ is an important consideration. Traditional CA was done by applied linguists in back rooms, not by learners in classrooms. The damage expected from MT interference in FL learning was viewed as an unstoppable epidemic, and the oftentimes equal and opposite benefits of facilitative positive MT transfers (Ringbom, 1987) were overlooked. All this has changed since CA took on a cognitive complexion, where the learner is more in charge of his own learning destiny, and whose explicit goals now include even cultural understanding as well as accuracy (Kellerman, 1995). The next step is for classroom-based CA to assume a metacognitive dimension. The structural and semantic relations between MT and FL are now seen as appropriate objects for study, as Widdowson (1992: 107) claims:

A pedagogy of language study along these lines would be concerned with comparisons: and it would in effect bring contrastive analysis out of exile and establish it as a methodological principle.

The principle is a sound one. What about its implementation? The first question is whether to start with the familiar, and target CR of MT:FL isomorphisms, or to do the converse, prioritising contrasts. Poldauf (1995: 6) suggests we should ‘proceed from what is common in the two languages’ and shift the focus to contrasts later. It used to be thought that this might build up false expectations in the learner of a pervasive sameness, precipitating indiscriminate MT transfers. Research on the learner’s ‘psychotypological’ selectivity in transfer (Kellerman, 1978) has, however, shown that this is not a real danger. On the other hand, early CR of the underlying, basic contrasts can both be
motivating (adding some intellectual content to FL learning) and instil a habit of caution in learners: transfer at the user’s risk!

It is often the case that the relationship between MT and FL is asymmetrical: corresponding to an MT form the FL has a parallel as well as a contrasting form. George (1972: 102) gives the example of English Mary’s book corresponding to two ‘equivalents’ in Malay: (1) buku Siti (‘book Mary’) and (2) Siti buku-nya (‘Mary book-her’). Establishing a link between the English target form and the second MT option would, he suggests, ‘make learners conscious of the English ‘s’, and learners do indeed happily resort to such mnemonics. George’s proposal is about explaining aspects of the FL to learners: note that a defining feature of explanation (James, 1994) is that the new and unfamiliar is presented in terms of the known and familiar: the unfamiliar FL form in terms of the familiar MT form.

Poldauf (1995: 9) has a slightly different suggestion, when he proposes that ‘Sometimes it may appear desirable to reach out for a minority phenomenon in the mother tongue’. He means that some FL forms that at first sight seem to be exotic, and not to have MT parallels, do indeed have such parallels, but they are unfamiliar by virtue of their low frequency. An example is the German FL palatal fricative [ç], as in ich, sicher. It is assumed to be exotic, ‘new’ and a learning problem, which is to overlook that it is part of the phonetic repertoire of many MT English speakers when they pronounce an initial [h] emphatically, as in huge, Hugh. Another example, for English learners of FL German having problems with negation, is to remind them of the formal, Biblical, and nonstandard dialectal English negation as in I know not a man. Interlingual CR implies bringing such parallels to learners’ attention.

‘Minority’ need not be limited to the low-frequency item. A similar facilitative explanation is of apparently arbitrary and semantically weakly-based oppositions in the FL. Learners often resist learning these since they seem to be redundant. Their high FL-inherent salience seems, paradoxically, to be overridden by the low salience of their MT equivalents. For example, why should the FL German have two words aber and sondern when English gets by effortlessly with but one? (Geddit?) Start by effecting some LA on the MT English learner’s part of the differences between the two but words (see Ducrot, 1978) in sentence pairs like She’s not Polish but Czech and She’s not Polish, but she speaks the language. Show the learner that it is not a case of the perversity of the FL, and that English makes the same semantic distinctions as German does, but German, in lexicalising the contrast, makes its expression more tangible, and you will create a learning-willingness or ‘permeability’ in the learner that will also enhance noticing thereafter.

George (1972: 180) regrets the abandonment of translation in FL teaching, which happened when Audiolingualism, which he sees as representing ‘an anti-intellectual style of thinking about education generally’, promoted the priorities of fluency and automatic response. He comments that ‘When time for translation is excluded, time for reflection (LA and CR: CJ) is excluded also’. If we were to make translation palatable to practical FL learners by severing the link it has in their minds with ‘literary’ translation, it would be a useful form of LA-with-CR. Widdowson (1972: 107) suggests that the new CA would make use of activities designed to promote the cultural study of language, looking at lexical
fields and ways of encoding concepts, social relationships, and even metaphors: this of course is exactly the sort of focus that translation calls for.

Translation is a particularly effective way to raise XLA, since, uniquely, in the act of translation two manifestations of MT and FL are juxtaposed, and language juxtaposition is the very essence of Contrastive Analysis. First (James, 1988), since the translator is continually switching to FL from MT and back, the two language systems are in mental co-activity. They need, at this time, both to be kept co-active but not wholly interactive, so must also be kept apart. Second, two texts are aligned in praesentia, the full source language text alongside the emerging target language text (or a full nonfinal draft of the latter). There are complex patterns of interaction at work, which must be controlled and monitored in ways that must invoke and exercise the translator’s XLA.

Conclusion

We have been given, by the LA movement, a provisional licence to talk about language in class. The language (neutral between MT and FL) classroom is one where students and teachers ought to feel free to talk about the MT and the FL separately, and, especially exciting, about the relations between them. There will consequently be less need for the FL teacher to turn to other subjects on the curriculum such as geography, history, citizenship and current affairs for surrogate content and intellectual stimulation: within-language and cross-language associations can become the new content.

References


